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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The Indian government has on several occasions advocated the idea that a 
common currency area be formed in the SAARC region. The response from other 
member countries has been somewhat lukewarm. They are unconvinced that the 
benefit of currency union establishment will outweigh the cost emanating from the 
abandonment of national monetary sovereignty.  
This paper seeks to empirically investigate the feasibility of a common 
currency area for Pakistan with each one of the following countries; India, 
Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia and Sri Lanka. This empirical investigation involves 
estimation of the co-variation of the bilateral real exchange rates using the Japanese 
Yen and the US dollar as base currencies. 
Section 2 begins with an eclectic overview of the Optimum Currency Area 
(OCA) literature. Section 3 presents the estimation methodology, Section 4 discusses 
the findings and Section 5 concludes the analysis. 
 
2.  AN  ECLECTIC  OVERVIEW  OF  THE  OCA  LITERATURE 
A currency area may be defined as a domain in which exchange rates of national 
currencies remain fixed, or else a currency area may have a single currency. In a currency 
area containing several currencies national central banks will have to co-ordinate their 
policies to ensure that the build up of the liabilities of a national central bank does not 
impair the convertibility of its national currency due to loss of reserves [Mundell (1961)]. 
On the other hand if there is a single currency and a single central bank in a 
currency area the liabilities of the central bank can expand in a more elastic manner. 
As Mundell has shown adjustment to balance of payments disequilibria are different 
in the two cases, even though fixed exchange rates exist in the case of the currency 
area with several national currencies. In a currency area with several national 
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currencies, surplus countries may impose the burden of adjustment to balance of 
payments disequilibria on deficit countries by refusing to alter national prices (alter 
the terms of trade). In a currency area, with a single currency, the single monetary 
authority can (but need not) expand money supply to raise output and employment in 
the deficit countries at the cost of raising prices in the surplus countries (and in the 
currency area as a whole).
1  The unemployment-inflation trade off exists in both 
cases of adjustment. Exchange rate flexibility has been seen as a means for 
“painlessly” sustaining equilibrium but [again as Mundell (1961) has shown] it 
cannot correct inter-regional imbalances without imposing unemployment on the 
deficit region and inflation on the surplus region.
2  Mundell goes on to argue that 
avoiding painful adjustment requires the existence of regional currencies. Other 
authors arguing against the adoption of a common currency by the European 
Common Market in the late 1950s based their case on the relative immobility of 
factors of production within the EEC [Meade (1957); Scitovsky (1958)] on the other 
hand saw (and advocated) the adoption of a common currency by the EEC as a 
means for promoting capital mobility within the EEC region
3 and for the adoption of 
common employment policies.  Thus an essential feature of a common currency area 
(or region) is a high degree of factor mobility as a substitute for exchange rate 
flexibility among national currencies. The optimum currency area may thus be 
defined as a region with near perfect internal factor mobility and high external factor 
immobility. In the Mundell-Meade-Scitovsky view, determining the ‘optimality’ of a 
currency area is essentially a measure of estimating its internal and external factor 
mobility. It is as important to stress that this argument assumes that… 
  •  Fully flexible exchange rate regimes can restore equilibrium without 
accelerating unemployment and inflation problems. 
  • Such stabilisation should be the only objective perused by policy-makers. 
  • Other criteria for determining the size of a common currency area mentioned 
by Mundell (1961) include… 
  • Cost of money changing and valuation. 
  • The import from non-currency area sources to total consumption in the 
currency area. The higher this ratio is the less optimal a region is for the 
formation of a currency area.
4 
 
1Keynesian assumptions in this analysis and that of Mundell (1961) are obvious. 
2Or sharing the burden of adjustment between the deficit region. 
3Which then comprised of only six countries, Belgium, France, W. Germany, Italy, Luxemburg 
and the Netherlands. 
4Mundell [(1961), p. 663] argues that a crucial assumption of the pro flexible exchange rate lobby 
is that trade unions are not willing to accept nominal wage adjustments but are willing to accept real wage 
adjustment required by fluctuations in the exchange rate. This assumption is likely to become increasingly 
unrealistic as the share of imports in consumption rises. Search for an Optimum Currency Area Partners 
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  • Markets within the currency union are strong enough to absorb speculative 
attacks.  
The savings of transaction costs have also been emphasised by several 
relatively recent studies, e.g. [Feldstein (1997) and Chang (1995)].
5  Other gains of 
currency area identified in the recent literature are enhanced price effectiveness and 
more integrated markets. It is evident that the traditional Mundell-McKinnon model 
fails to capture many of these dynamic effects.
6  Cooper, et al. (1998) extend this 
argument to show that welfare gains associated with reduced trade frictions created 
by the existence of multiple currencies also occur to individual consumers in the 
common currency area. They also stress the inflation reducing impact of a common 
currency union “through internalising the external effects of national polices” (1998, 
p. 3). This also enhances consumer welfare, for agents are no longer hurt by the 
inflation policies of other (currency union member) governments. Thus the formation 
of a currency union can generate allocative efficiencies and reduce inflation related 
distortions. 
Copper and Kempf (1998) do not estimate the relative significance of these 
gains or weigh them against the type of costs mentioned by Mundell or McKinnon 
and recognised implicitly in Section 4 of their own paper which shows that “acting 
independently governments will deviate from the monetary union outcome by 
imposing (national) currency requirements (formation of a currency union) is not a 
Nash equilibrium of our game” (1998, p. 4). There are real costs of abandoning 
national monetary sovereignty in a currency union (entailed in the loss of an 
instrument of stabilisation in conditions of uncertainty), which may significantly 
outweigh welfare gains to consumers.
7 
Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999) identify the following criteria for the 
existence of a successful common currency area. 
(i) Symmetry of shocks across countries;
8 (ii) Trade and investment integration, 
and (iii) Labour mobility and wage flexibility. The existence of common regional (as 
against global and country specific) shocks provides a strong case for a common 
currency.
9 
  Lee,  et al. (2002) argue that increased integration with the world 
economy can also sometime strengthen the case for adopting a common currency. 
They decompose output variation in East Asia during 1978–1990 and 1991–1999 
 
5In 1990 the European Commission estimated that gains of about 0.5 percent of community GDP 
would result from the adaptation of a single currency [Emerson, et al. (1992)]. 
6As Wyplisz (1997) argues this traditional model provides very little support for the establishment 
of a monetary union in Europe. 
7Cooper and Kempf recognise that gains to monetary union may perhaps be modest and “our 
paper avoided some potential cost of monetary union” (1998, p. 27). 
8The cost of loss of national control over monetary policy can be reduced if the countries adopting 
a common currency have synchronised business cycles for then a common monetary policy can serve all 
countries in the region. 
9It is on this basis that Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) advocated a common currency for East 
Asia. Rasheed and Ansari 
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into a “regional common, a “world common” and a “country specific” component 
and find that the impact of the region common and global common factor increases 
significantly (relative to the country specific factor) during 1991-1999. The impact 
of the “region common factor” is more than that of the “global common factor” in 
the case of the East Asian region than it is for the EU during 1991-1999 according to 
Lee, et al. estimations.
10  Prima facie a currency union between Thailand, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and South Korea (but not for China and Singapore) can have a strong 
beneficial effect on output stabilisation in the region. 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) using an index developed earlier [Eichengreen 
and Bayoumi (1999)] also find the East Asian region sufficiently integrated for the 
formation of a currency union. They note however that the region lacks effective 
institutions, sound financial systems, a history of integrationist policy and political net 
working which facilitated the establishment of a currency union in Europe. 
Several studies have tried to identify the determinants of synchronisation of 
business cycles among a group of countries. Trade has been identified as an 
important source of co-movements of output [Rose (1998), p. 200]; Output 
movement synchronisation can also be influenced by changes in relative prices of 
factors and products [Kraay and Ventura (2000)]. If trade leads to specialisation, 
industry related shocks may reduce synchronisation of output movement among the 
trading partners [Frankel and Rose (1998)]. Thus both the volume and the 
composition of trade is likely to effect output synchronisation—bilateral intra 
industry trade may be expected to have greater impact on output synchronisation 
than bilateral inter-industry trade. Higher co-movements of output are also 
stimulated by similarities of the structure of production [Imbs (1999)].  Lee, et al. 
find that in the case of European countries output co-movements are positively 
associated with the level of inter-regional trade and the similarity of trade structure. 
It is negatively associated with per capita GDP
11 and similarity of industrial 
structure. Given the higher level of inter regional trade and greater similarities of 
economic structure, relative to Europe, Lee, et al. (2002) argue that East Asian 
economies are likely to benefit more from the establishment of a currency union than 
the European countries.
12  Output co-variation is also likely to be positively effected 
by capital mobility for this enhances the speed of adjustment to shocks. But capital 
market integration induces greater specialisation and therefore larger asymmetric 
shocks affecting the integrated countries. This reduces the attractiveness of forming a 
currency union by countries with high levels of capital mobility. Financial 
integration is in the main a global (not a regional) phenomenon. Park and Sang 
(2001) show that despite high levels of inter-regional trade there is little evidence of 
increased regional financial integration in Asia. Financial liberalisation increases 
 
10This is also accepted by Eichengreen (2004). 
11“Other things remaining constant”. 
12Global financial shocks may have different on regional partners. Search for an Optimum Currency Area Partners 
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global not regional integration of national capital and money markets. Regional 
financial integration in South Asia for example is also inhibited by the small size of 
banks and their absence in other countries of the region. Other financial institutions 
(and instruments) also lack a regional presence. Financial liberalisation has increased 
the dominance of American banks in syndication and M&As transactions in the 
Indian financial markets (as also in South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia). Financial 
liberalisation is thus unlikely to stimulate regional financial integration or the 
formation of a currency union. Financial liberalisation does increase pressure for 
maintaining stable currency values vis-à-vis major hard currencies. Forming a 
currency union may be an instrument for reducing dependence on imperialist 
financial markets, but that is unlikely to an objective pursued by the incumbent 
policy-makers of South Asia. The difference in the impact of financial liberalisation 
on global as against regional financial integration illustrates the dependence of the 
potential usefulness of the formation of a currency union on external factors 
(external that is to the region forming the currency union). 
 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
This paper is an attempt to study co-movements in the bilateral real 
exchange rates of Pakistan and four other countries (Bangladesh, India, Saudi 
Arabia and Sri Lanka) in the region with each of which, a currency union may be 
envisaged. The theoretical framework is provided by Generalised Purchasing 
Power Parity (GPPP) theory, which shows that when countries are highly 
integrated even though their bilateral exchange rates are non-stationary, they can 
share a common stochastic trend and exhibit a long run integration relationship 
[Enders, et al. (1994)]. GPPP theory can be interpreted in terms of an optimum 
currency area. If co movements of bilateral rates of Pakistan and any or all of the 
other four countries with their major trading partners (the US and Japan) are 
synchronised a common currency can be formed, since this synchronisation 
reflects that Pakistan and some or all of the other five countries experience similar 
types of real disturbances. Forming a currency union in these circumstances can 
reduce money transaction costs, eliminate exchange rate uncertainty and generate 
the consumer welfare gains suggested by the literature. This investigation will be 
followed up by more detailed analysis of the determinants of synchronisation of 
business cycles (as identified in the literature discussed above) of Pakistan and 
potential currency union partners in the future. 
We begin by estimating the interrelationship of economic variables measuring 
economic activity in Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Saudi Arabia, and Bangladesh. The 
variables are Real per capita GDP, Trade Balance, Terms of Trade, Volume of Trade 
and Bilateral Real Exchange Rates with the US dollar and the Japan Yen as base 
currencies. Rasheed and Ansari 
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Co-variations in the movements of these variables may be taken as signifying 
synchronisation of the business cycles in the comparator countries. As Lee (2003) 
notes if these fundamental variables are significantly interrelated even though 
bilateral exchange rates are non stationary, they may share common stochastic trends 
and exhibit a long run co-integration relationship. We estimate the correlation 
between the bilateral exchange rates on the one hand and bilateral terms of trade and 
the relative per capita real GDP of each of the comparator countries.  Our argument 
is that a common currency area is justified in case of countries (a) whose 
fundamental variables are significantly integrated; (b) their bilateral exchange rates 
are positively correlated to movements in their relative real per capita GDP and 
relative terms of trade. Under these circumstances we expect the co-movement of 
bilateral real exchange rate of such countries with their major trading partner, (US 
and Japan), should share a common stochastic trend. 
Following Lee (2003) we estimate the real bilateral exchange rate of 
comparator countries using the US dollar and the Yen as the base currencies. We 
define the bilateral real exchange rates of all the countries in the group with Japan 
and USA as the base countries as  
Rt 
i/j = Et 
i/j * (CPIt
j/CPIt
i)  … … … … …  (1) 
Where Rt is Bilateral Real Exchange Rate, Et 
i/j is the nominal exchange rate between 
two countries i the foreign country and j the domestic country. In our model foreign 
countries are the base countries, i.e., Japan and the USA. CPI is consumer’s price 
index for foreign and domestic countries (i.e., Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Saudi 
Arabia and Sri Lanka). We will take natural log of all the bilateral real exchange 
rates to perform various tests.  
We perform the Augmented Dickey-Fuller ADF test (1979, 1981) to 
determine the stationarity of each bilateral real exchange rate and test for the 
existence of a unit root in the bilateral real exchange rates. There have been several 
theoretical and empirical studies on the stationarity and determinants of the bilateral 
real exchange rates. Most empirical studies [e.g., Adler and Lehman (1983); Corbae 
and Ouliaris (1988); Enders (1988); Patel (1990); Kim and Enders (1991)] fail to 
reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the bilateral real exchange rate series they 
examine. If a unit root is present in a bilateral real exchange rate, then there exist real 
variables determining the real exchange rate. Real disturbances, including changes in 
terms of trade, tax system, or productivity can lead to a new equilibrium real 
exchange rate. We test for the existence of a stationary equilibrium error. The 
existence of this test implies that non-stationary variables share a common stochastic 
trend. We test the co-integration relationship between bilateral real exchange rate 
pairs, based on the maximal eigen values test. A speed of adjustment vector is 
estimated for the bilateral exchange rates. VAR estimates are used to generate the 
responses of the real exchange rate to a positive one standard deviation shock in the Search for an Optimum Currency Area Partners 
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residuals. We try to identify a common stochastic trend in the variation of the real 
exchange rates. Finally we will estimate the model… 
Yt = a + b*ERt + c*Yt–1 + d*(XR + MR)  … … …  (2) 
to estimate the relative importance of exchange rate (ER) stabilisation and the 
growth of regional exports and imports (XR + MR) in determining the growth of real 
per capita income (Yt) for Pakistan. Estimation procedures and data used are 
presented along with the discussion of the results in the next section. All the data has 
been taken from various issues of International Financial Statistics on quarterly basis 
from 1981:1 to 2002:4. 
 
4.  RESULTS 
(a) Correlations of Movements in Fundamental Variables (1982:1-2002:4) 
The preliminary evidence presented in Table 1 shows greatest synchronisation 
between the business cycle of Pakistan and Bangladesh. Correlations are high in all 
variables with the right signs.  Correlations are much lower in the case of India and 
Sri Lanka. Similarly there is no evidence of synchronisations of business cycles of 
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. 
 
Table 1 
Correlation between Pakistan and Comparator Countries Macroeconomic Variables 
 BD  IND  SA  SL 
Real per Cap  0.83  0.93  0.89  0.95 
Trade Balance  0.79  0.58  0.33  0.32 
Terms of Trade  0.81  0.51  0.40  0.47 
Vol of Trade  0.96  0.36  0.51  0.27 
Ex Rate (Base Yen)  0.93  0.97  0.72  0.95 
Ex Rate (Base US $)  0.88  0.97  0.31  0.83 
 
Table 2a 
ADF Unit Root Tests on BRER Base Japanese Yen 
  Lag Length  Stationarity at…  ADF Statistic 
BD 2  First  Difference  –0.65 
IND 2  First  Difference  –0.98 
PK 1  First  Difference  –0.91 
SA 2  First  Difference  –0.25 
SL 1  First  Difference  –0.7 
With no trend and intercept, at 1 percent critical value is –2.65, at 5 percent it is –1.96 and at 5 percent it is 




ADF Unit Root Tests on BRER Base US $ 
  Lag Length  Stationarity at…  ADF Statistic 
BD 2  First  Difference  –0.99 
IND 2  First  Difference  –0.22 
PK 1  First  Difference  –0.04 
SA 2  First  Difference  –0.87 
SL 1  First  Difference  –0.8 
With no trend and intercept, at 1 percent critical value is –2.65, at 5 percent it is –1.96 and at 5 percent it is 
–1.6. 
 
(b) ADF Unit Root Tests on BRER with Base US $ and Japanese Yen 
Tables 2a and 2b present the results of the ADF test to determine the 
stationarity of each bilateral real exchange rate series. As the literature notes the 
existence of the unit root in bilateral real exchange rate shows there exist real 
variables as its determinants [Enders and Hurn (1994)]. 
The Augmented Dicky Fuller Test tests the null hypothesis of a unit root, our 
results suggest that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of unit root in each series I 
(1) with the Japanese Yen and the US dollar as the base currency in the case  of ADF 
statistic of Pakistan and four comparator countries.  
 
(c)  Speed of Adjustment  
Estimates of the speed of adjustment “β” with Japanese Yen and US Dollar as 
the base currencies. α is the intercept of the equation… 
Rt 
i/j = α + β Rt 
i/k + ε  … … … … …  (3) 
Where  R is real bilateral exchange rate, i is base currency, j and k are the two 
countries. 
Estimates of “β” in the equation represent the speed of adjustment in the 
dependant bilateral real exchange rate due to changes in various independent 
bilateral real exchange rates (Table 3).  Speed of adjustment is particularly high 
among the bilateral real exchange rate of South Asian countries. The Pak Rupee 
reacts to the changes in bilateral real exchange rate of Saudi Arabia (with US $ and 
Japanese Yen as base) significantly later than it does with respect to the changes in 
the bilateral real exchange rate of India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. It is interesting 
to note that the shortest speed of adjustment of Pak rupee is with the Bangladeshi 
Taka and the longest speed of adjustment is with respect to Saudi Arabia with both 




Speed of Adjustment of Pakistan Rupee 
    Base Japan Yen  Base US $ 
    Pair  α  β  α  β 
PK by BD  –18.6  1.24  –23.44  1.53 
PK  by  IND  1.27 1.15 1.65 1.31 
PK by SA  –111.20  0.52  66.01  0.49 
PK by SL  –2.41  0.87  –1.6  0.84 
 
(d)  Co-integration Test 
We test the co-integration relationship between two variables based on the 
eigen values. These results are presented in Tables 4a and 4b. 
 
Table 4 a, b 
Pakistan’s Co-integration Relation with Base Japanese Yen and Base US Dollar 
 BD  IND  SA  SL 
Table 4a   Base Yen      
  Eigen Value  0.51  0.42  0.36  0.4 
  Likelihood Ratio  22.3  13.2  10.9  18.57 
  5% Critical Value  19.96  19.96  19.96  19.96 
  Co-integrating  Yes  No  No  No 
Table 4b Base US $  BD IND SA  SL 
  Eigen Value  0.54  0.42  0.56  0.46 
  Likelihood Ratio   24.6  14.5  13.1  20.1 
  5% Critical Value  19.96  19.96  19.96  19.96 
  Co-integrating  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Assumption: No deterministic trend in the data series with intercept in the co-integration relationship.  
 
The evidence of co-integration is found in the case of Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh with US dollar as a base. However with Japanese Yen as a base, only 
BRER of Bangladesh is integrating with Pakistan’s BRER. 
 
Standard Deviation of Bilateral Real Exchange Rates 
Standard deviation of bilateral real exchange rate is presented in Table 5. The 
values of standard deviation of the Pakistani bilateral real exchange rate with Japanese 
Yen as the base country is higher then that of Bangladesh, India and Saudi Arabia. 
Using the US dollar as the base currency the standard deviation of Pakistan’s bilateral 
real exchange rate is higher than the standard deviation of all other countries. The only 
country the standard deviation of whose exchange rate (using both Yen and US dollar 




Standard Deviation of Bilateral Real Exchange Rates 
Country BD  IND  PAK  SA  SL  BD  IND  PAK  SA  SL 
Base  Currency  Yen Yen Yen Yen Yen  US $  US $  US $  US $  US $ 
Standard Deviation  12.3  12.7  14.3 0.21 21.6 11.2 12.1 13.5 0.21 19.9 
 
(e)  Impulse Response Function  
We use VAR estimates to generate the impulse response function of 
bilateral real exchange rate to a positive one SD shock in their residuals. The 
Appendix A presents figures showing the impulse response function. They 
indicate the impact on the Pakistani bilateral real exchange rate of fluctuations in 
the bilateral real exchange rate of the other currencies, using both US dollar and 
Yen as the base currencies. We see that the greatest impact on Pakistan’s 
bilateral real exchange rate is of the fluctuations of the currencies of India and 
Bangladesh. Result for the Gulf country is inconclusive. The greatest impact of 
fluctuations in the Pakistan’s bilateral real exchange rate is on the bilateral real 
exchange rate of Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and India in that order whether we use 
Yen or US dollar as the base currency. 
 
(f)  Common Stochastic Trends 
There have been many empirical studies for identifying common stochastic 
trends; see Ahn (1997); Engle and Kozicki (1993); Vahid and Engle (1993). We 
have found the existence of a co-integrating vector using the Yen base for Pakistan 
with Bangladesh and using the US dollar base for Pakistan with Bangladesh and Sri 
Lanka. Interestingly India does not appear in either group. We would therefore 
expect the existence of a common stochastic trend between Pakistan with 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. In this study the obtained common stochastic trend 
represents a weighted average of the Pakistan bilateral real exchange rate and the 
bilateral real exchange rate of the other countries where the co-integrating vector has 
been found. The ratio of the weights between the currencies of Pakistan and the other 
countries are given in Table 6. The common trend apparently represents a weighted 
average of two BRERs. The ratio of the weights is compatible with the ratio of 
openness of the two economies, where the openness is defined by the ratio of the 
sum of total exports and imports to GDP. The graphs showing common stochastic 
trends are given in Appendix B. 
 
(g)  Exchange Rate as Determinant of Real GDP Growth 
Finally we estimated the log version of the equation 




  RPCGDP = Real per Capita GDP. 
  BRER = Pakistan’s Bilateral Real Exchange Rate (in US $ and Yen). 
  RVT = Pakistan’s relative volume of trade. 
 
Table 6 
Pakistan’s Orthogonal Matrix 
With BD (with Base Yen)    With SL (with Base Yen) 
 0.61  0.48          0.43  0.48 
 
 0.48  0.39          0.48  0.57 
Beta  Ratio     Beta  Ratio 
0.81      1 . 1 5  
With BD (with Base US $)    With SL (with Base US $) 
 0.42  0.49          0.42  0.49 
 
 0.49  0.52          0.49  0.58 
Beta  Ratio     Beta  Ratio 
0.65      1 . 5 5  
 
Table 7a 
H0: Coefficient is Insignificant or Zero 
Variable Coefficient  t-statistic Prob.  H0 
C  0.31 3.44 0.0033  Rejected 
BRER–PK–BASEUS –0.008  –2.22  0.0045 Rejected 
RPCGDP–PK(–1)  0.76 4.03 0.0012  Rejected 
RVT–PK 0.016  0.81 0.61  Accepted 
R
2 0.979  Adj  R
2 0.976   
 
Table 7b 
H0: Coefficient is Insignificant or Zero 
Variable Coefficient  t-statistic Prob.  H0 
C  0.27 3.82 0.0025  Rejected 
BRER–PK–BASEJP –0.0007  –2.25  0.004  Rejected 
RPCGDP–PK(–1)  0.69 3.99 0.0018  Rejected 
RVT–PK 0.009  0.74 0.73  Accepted 
R
2 0.97  Adj  R
2 0.96   Rasheed and Ansari 
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Results presented in Tables 7a and 7b shows that variation in Pakistan real 
exchange rate and in the proportion of Pakistan’s trade with the comparator countries 
in our sample are significant determinants of per capita GDP growth except relative 
volume of trade but the stabilisation of Pakistan’s real exchange rate—through a 
formation of a currency union—is unlikely to have impact on economic growth of 
Pakistan since the coefficients of BRER both bases are very low in magnitudes. 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
Our major conclusions are … 
  • Preliminary analysis shows greatest synchronisation in the business cycles 
of Pakistan and Bangladesh. Synchronisation is much weaker with respect to 
India and absent in the case of the Gulf country. 
  • The existence of a unit root is found at the first difference level for all 
currencies. 
  • Speed of adjustment of Pakistan’s bilateral exchange rate (using both US 
dollar and Japanese Yen as the base currencies) is quicker for South Asian 
then Saudi Arabia. 
  • A co-integration relationship is most pronounced between the Pakistani 
rupee, the Bangladeshi Taka and the Sri Lankan rupee. There is no evidence 
for the existence of such co integration with the Indian rupee. The values of 
the co-integrating coefficients suggest a similarity of the demand structure 
of Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.  
  • The strongest impact on Pakistan’s exchange rate is that of variations in the 
Bangladeshi Taka and the Sri Lankan rupee. 
  • The greatest impact of the fluctuations of the Pakistan rupee is on the 
Bangladeshi Taka and the Sri Lankan rupee. 
  • A common stochastic trend has been identified in the case of Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. 
  • However stabilising the exchange rate is unlikely to have a significant 
impact on GDP growth in Pakistan. The formation of a currency union 
cannot be a high policy concern. 
These results suggest that some grounds exist for considering the possibilities 
of establishing a currency union between Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. 
Clearly India is too large an economy and its business cycle is weakly synchronised 
with that of Pakistan. Its demand structure is significantly different and a long-term 
co-integration relationship has not been found between the Pakistani and Indian 
rupee. This preliminary investigation has not touched upon many other relevant 
questions (briefly outlined in Section 2). Assessment of factor mobility (within the 
proposed currency area and between it and the rest of the world), list of money 
exchange and valuation, ratio of imports from the non currency area to total Search for an Optimum Currency Area Partners 
 
805
consumption of the area members, trade and investment structures, inflation 
proneness etc. is required before a currency union can be advocated. Similarly levels 
of integration of countries forming a proposed currency union with the world 
economy and within their region should be assessed. Determinants of 
synchronisation of business cycles of proposed currency member union member 
countries should be identified. Trade structures and productive structures of the 
proposed currency union member countries are particularly impatient in this context. 
This proposal for a currency area including East and West Pakistan (each region 
being otherwise autonomous in its macroeconomic policies) was first put forward by 
Shiakh Mujib (who interpreted the 1940-Pakistan resolution as envisaging this idea). 
East and West Pakistan had a common central bank, a common parliament and a 
common supreme court, which functioned for a quarter of a century. Creating a 
single monetary authority with equal national representation is feasible as unlike in 
the case of India; the population of Pakistan and Bangladesh are not vastly unequal. 
Given this common historical background transparency could be built into the 
monetary management process (broadly along the lines proposed by the Awami 
League economists in PIDE during the 1960s).  Creating open capital accounts is 
also not difficult as such as more (unlike capital account liberalisation vis-à-vis 
India) is unlikely to be significantly de-stabilising for either Pakistan or Bangladesh. 
Both countries have during the past decade been re-capitalising their commercial 
banks, strengthening prudential regulations and strengthening corporate governance 
procedures. There are two well known concepts of convergence that appears in the 
discussions of economic growth across regions; Ahmad and Naz (2000), however the 
concept of conditional convergence is far more applicable in the situation of OCA 
and monetary convergences in our case. A gradual and conditional convergence of 
financial structures and monetary transmission mechanisms is more feasible for 
Pakistan and Bangladesh than it is for a currency union containing the giant Indian 
economy and the other South Asian pygmies. 
In conclusion we would like to stress that establishing a common fiscal 
system is not a pre-requisite and may not be a consequence of creating a currency 
union. Eichengreen (2004) and several other authors support this view and the 
Awami League PIDE economists were also of this view. That is why they advocated 
the abandonment of fiscal federalism while remaining supporters of a common 
monetary policy for East and West Pakistan (one currency, one State Bank and a 
common transmission mechanism). Despite monetary union a common fiscal system 
has not been created in the EU. The EU budget is in a typical year less was than 1 
percent of EU. GDP illustrating the triviality of the loudly trumpeted stabilisation 
measures. Counter cyclical stabilisation is the responsibility of national governments, 
which collect taxes and undertake public spending. Deficit ceilings set by the EU 
growth and stabilisation pact are routinely ignored and large deficits in Germany and 
Italy have not driven EU wide real interest rates, for real interest rates are determined 
by global capital markets, not the capital markets of the EU region. Rasheed and Ansari 
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Eichengreen (2004) has also argued that there is no need for instituting a lengthy 
pre qualification period; (as was the case in the EU), during which Bangladesh and 
Pakistan are expected to satisfy convergence criteria with respect to budget deficits, 
inflation, interest rates and exchange rates. There is no need to monitor compliance with 
strict numerical targets for these macro aggregates: de Grauve (2004) shows that interest 
and exchange rates variations are endogenous. They will converge us expectation of the 
formation of the currency union increase. Exchange rates targets are unachievable if 
capital account liberalisation is also mandated. Moreover meeting the targets during the 
qualifying periods is no guaranteeing that they will be sustainable after the currency 
union has been formed. Several EU members have significantly exceeded deficits targets 
after 2001. The real pre conditions for the formation of a currency union are financial 
institutional convergence and political will. There is of course a twin causal relations 
between them hence the formation of a currency union is the both the cause and the effect 
of an enhanced political empathy and greater convergence of financial and monetary 
institutions and mechanisms. Policy-makers in Bangladesh and Pakistan should keep this 
in mind when addressing these questions. 
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Note: Orthogonal matrix with each country is obtained by I2 – β(β’ β)
–1 . Common Stochastic trends can 
be constructed by (brer of country j, brer of country k) * first column of orthogonal matrix. β is 
coefficient vector obtained by using Equation 3. 
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